In the past decade, pirates from Somalia have carried out thousands of attacks on cargo ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, causing what others have identified as significant damage to maritime trade. In this paper, we use variations in the spread and intensity of Somali piracy to estimate its effect on the volume of international trade. By comparing trade volume changes along shipping routes located in pirate waters to those that are not, we estimate that Somali piracy reduced bilateral trade passing through the Gulf of Aden by 1.7-1.9 percent per year from 2000 to 2010. In addition, we find larger reductions for trade in bulk commodities, which are generally shipped by sea and are more likely to fall prey to piracy attacks. While our estimates suggest that the trade costs of piracy are much lower than what has been suggested in the existing literature, we find that they remain significant and unevenly distributed, with five countries and the European Union shouldering 70% of the total costs. JEL Codes: F1, F14
Introduction
Maritime piracy around Somalia has emerged over the past two decades as a legitimate threat to international trade. The combination of weak governmental institutions, a natural geographic choke point in the Gulf of Aden, and a significant flow of ships through the Gulf has allowed pirates to establish safe harbors from which to attack a plethora of available targets. Successful attacks have significant consequences: hijacked ships, kidnapped crews, expensive ransom negotiations, and loss of life. As merchant ships are attacked and trade flows disrupted, the cost of transporting goods through pirate waters increases, possibly discouraging trade through these regions. This problem has global dimensions. Annually, we estimate that 12 percent of world trade is estimated to pass through the Suez Canal and is therefore affected by this threat.
Countries in the Indian Ocean region, whose ports are in relatively close proximity to pirate waters, ship as much as 60 percent of their imports travel through pirate infested waters. These countries are potentially exposed to significant trade disruptions, and could be the victims of pirate-induced price distortions in their traded goods, with consequent welfare implications.
In this paper, we lay out a simple model of bilateral trade where piracy increases trade costs, and derive an augmented gravity equation to estimate the effect of pirate activity on trade volumes. Using a global panel data set combining information on bilateral volumes of trade and on reported pirate attacks, we first study how annual trade between pairs of countries that transfer goods through pirate infested waters is affected by the intensity of piracy. We then compare this effect to trade between country pairs that arguably use other shipping lanes that are free of Somali pirates.
We estimate the cost of piracy in two ways. We first follow the existing literature in measuring pirate activity as the total number of pirate attacks in a given year that took place around Somalia. This includes successful hijackings and boardings as well as attempted boardings and cases where a ship was fired upon. A drawback of this estimation strategy is that the number of attacks could be endogenous to trade for a number of reasons including reverse causality and omitted factors. For instance, if more ships transit through an area, the probability of an encounter mechanically increases. Alternatively, if ships hire (unobserved) protective military vessels in response to high piracy risks, we could observe fewer attempted attacks, even though shipping costs would have increased. For this reason, we use the geographic reach of pirates as a second measure of pirate activity, which has the advantage of being generally unrelated to the volume and frequency of international trade. From the early 2000s until 2009, Somali pirates significantly improved and refined their equipment and organizational structures, often by adopting more sophisticated weapon and transportation systems. Technological improvements have allowed pirates to attack further away from their coastal bases in Somalia, increasing considerably the geographic spread of pirate-infested waters and the amount of time ships spend transiting through those waters, thus raising trade costs.
We find that piracy originating from Somalia and occurring in or around the Gulf of Aden significantly reduces trade between county-pairs that ship goods though the Gulf. The reduction in the volume of bilateral trade due to the increase in attacks and in pirate reach between 2000 and 2010 averages 1.7-1.9 percent per year. This estimate takes into account all tradeable goods, even those less susceptible to maritime transport. Trade in bulk commodities, which are almost exclusively shipped by sea and are the most likely to respond to trade frictions because of their larger elasticity of demand, is estimated to fall an average of 4.1 percent per year.
We also carry out a heterogeneity analysis to study the variation of trade costs along several relevant dimensions. We find that piracy in the Gulf of Aden reduces trade between countries that are separated by relatively short distances, but not between countries that are far apart.
This evidence is consistent with shorter routes witnessing a larger relative increase in trade costs given that a larger fraction of the total distance is traveled through pirate waters. This is also consistent with more distant country pairs having other routing possibilities that avoid the Gulf of Aden. When considering which nations are most affected by the piracy problem, we find that the effect of piracy does not vary systematically with the income of a trading partner.
Applying our estimates to the value of trade moving through the Gulf of Aden suggests that no country-including those with a significant share of trade moving through Aden-loses more than 2 percent of trade value because of piracy. However, in our view it would be incorrect to conclude that the costs from piracy are negligible. When considering the absolute value of trade losses, we estimate an average annual loss of $25 billion, with most of that accruing to a handful of countries. In particular, our estimates suggest that 4 countries and the European Union shouldered 70% of the total costs of piracy, with the EU in particular losing an annual $11 billion in trade, or 44 percent of the total cost.
Our paper provides important and robust evidence that the threat of violence and, more generally, the possibility of disruptions in the transportation network have a negative effect on trade. In this regard, the paper shares an important commonality with Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) ; Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) ; Blomberg and Hess (2006) ; Mirza and Verdier (2008) ; De Sousa, Mirza, and Verdier (2008) , which find an effect of violence and terrorism on transnational commerce.
From a methodological viewpoint, our paper adds insights to the gravity equation literature by emphasizing the role of multilateral resistance terms in estimations of time-varying trade costs. Since the seminal contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , it is well known that omitting the multilateral resistance terms from gravity estimations leads to biased estimates.
However, due to data limitations or computational constraints, it is not uncommon in panel datasets to account for the multilateral resistance terms using country rather than country-year fixed effects. As our results show, this substitution is problematic for time varying trade costs because of the likely existence of common trends between the uncontrolled time dimension of a country's multilateral resistance and the bilateral trade costs.
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Our paper joins an economic literature assessing modern piracy.
2 Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller 1 The debate on the role of multilateral resistance terms has been central in the "border puzzle" literature, which focuses on a time invariant trade cost. Other gravity variables of interest, such as bilateral distance or common language, are also time invariant. So, it is mainly studies that investigate the impact of trade policies where time-varying trade frictions are the focus. Interestingly, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that once accounting for country-year fixed effects the effect of free trade agreements on member countries' trade is five times larger. This bias correction goes in the opposite direction compared to this paper, which goes to illustrate the many channels through which the omitted multilateral resistance terms affect the estimates.
2 A broader literature has looked at a number of other interesting aspects of Somali piracy that inform our model and assumptions. For example, de Groot, Rablen, and Shortland (2012) analyze ransom negotiations in the Somali context and find that observables such as length of imprisonment, size of boat, and nationality of the crew are all significant determinants of ransom value. Similarly, Ambrus and Chaney (2013) consider ransom negotiations between Spain and the Barbary pirates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and find that people in captivity for longer periods were ransomed more cheaply.
(2012) estimate that the increase in pirate attacks in 2008 caused an increase in shipping costs between 8 and 13 percent for bulk goods traveling through the Gulf of Aden. Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2012) study the effect of piracy on the volume of international trade between Europe and Asia, and find that exports fell by 11 percent for every 10 ships that are hijacked by pirates from Somalia, Southern or South-Eastern Asia.
3 A recent report by the World Bank (2013) focuses strictly on Somali piracy and, using a methodology similar to ours to identify trade routes affected by piracy, exploits a difference-in-difference strategy on a sample of 150 countries. The study finds that trade flows of affected countries fell by 7.4 percent after 2006 due to Somali piracy, which corresponds to an increase in trade costs of 0.74 -1.49 percent. We improve on the strategy in the World Bank report by using a rich structure of regression fixed effects to account for country-specific changes in the patterns of trade over time (i.e., multilateral resistance terms), and by using measures of piracy intensity (i.e., number of attacks and pirate reach) which better capture the significant ramp-up of pirate activity after 2006.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes piracy in the Gulf of Aden and discusses the mechanisms through which piracy may affect trade volumes and trade costs. Section 3 lays out the empirical model for bilateral trade. Section 4 describes the data sources and variable construction, while section 5 presents our results on the impact of piracy on international trade. Section 6 concludes.
Background

Spread of Somali piracy
Piracy affects a large number of countries in the world, especially around the tropics. The concentration of piracy in these regions can be seen in Figure 1 , which maps all recorded instances of pirate attacks collected by the International Maritime Bureau from 2000 to 2011. 
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A key characteristic of Somali piracy is that, in a short amount of time, it has experienced a significant technological evolution. 6 Initially, pirates operated dhows or fishing boats to assault vessels that came too close to the Somali coast.As commercial vessels improved their defenses and stayed away from the Horn of Africa, pirates enrolled better arms and faster and more powerful boats, which allowed them to seek targets further afield (Tsvetkova, 2009 ).
As operations became more organized and better funded, pirates invested in a "mothership" strategy involving a large pirate ship serving as a base for a number of speed boats located
deep in the open ocean (Treves, 2009 ). Upon finding a suitable target, pirates would board the speedboats and quickly approach and attempt to hijack the target ship. If captured, the vessel would then be directed to a pirate safe haven in Somalia, where it remained while ransom negotiations took place (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011) . The result of this technological and organizational evolution is that piracy increased dramatically in intensity, violence, and 4 While the number of attacks is high by simple count, the larger volume of vessels passing through the Malacca Strait implies that the ships traveling through that region are less likely to be attacked. While precise numbers are difficult to find, Evers and Gerke (2006) estimate that more than 50,000 ships travel through the Malacca Strait each year, with more recent estimates as high as 70,000 ships per year. On the other hand, the Suez Canal Authority reports indicate that travel through the Canal peaked in 2008 with 21,415 ships.
5 Recent reports indicate that piracy is on the decline in Somalia (Saul, 2013) . Many observers believe the ongoing slow down in attacks is due to the presence of navy patrols and enhanced onboard security (World Bank, 2013) . These methods of pirate repression are quite costly; thus, pirate risk is thought to continue to affect trade even in the absence of a significant number of attacks.
6 A broad literature has assessed both the manner in which pirates in general and Somali pirates in particular operate and the effectiveness of various strategies designed to stop them. While this information is informative for our econometric modeling and the interpretation of our results, it is not the focus of our analysis. Instead we invite readers interested in these issues to see Gilpin (2009); Hastings (2009); Coggins (2010) ; Psarros, Christiansen, Skjong, and Gravir (2011); Percy and Shortland (2013) , and the World Bank report (2013). kilometers from the coast and, after 2005, some attacks were taking place 1,200 kilometers from the Somali coast. As the reach of piracy extended further and further into the Indian Ocean, ships were spending more and more of their travel time in "pirate waters".
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While both the number of attacks and the geographic spread of piracy were increasing in the second half of the decade, the timing between the two dimensions of expansion differed somewhat. Figure 4 graphs the monthly counts of attacks, the distance of the furthest attack from a Somali port by month and year, and (with a dashed line) the maximum distance in kilometers away from Somalia that pirates had attacked up to that point-a distance which we refer to as Reach. The frequency of attacks was at its most intense rate in the [2007] [2008] [2009] period. On the other hand, the ability of pirates to reach targets increased the fastest in the 2005-2007 period.
Cost of piracy
Piracy imposes two types of costs on maritime carriers. A direct cost is accrued in the eventuality of pirate capture. Once a ship is captured, it is often driven to the Somali coast where cargo, crew and ship are taken hostage, often for long periods of time, while a ransom is negotiated.
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Most hijacking cases are resolved with the ship, crew, and cargo being returned to the owner once the ransom has been paid. Sometimes captured vessels are retained and turned into pirate mother-ships, or crew members are killed or die in captivity.
9
The probability that a hijacking occurs is generally quite small, although not negligible.
7 Piracy in the Gulf of Aden is very different from the piracy experienced in the Strait of Malacca. The latter usually consists of small groups of pirates boarding ships and taking valuables such as cash, personal property, and other small items. These Malacca pirates tend to act like seagoing burglars, using the threat of violence to take what they can carry and make a relatively rapid departure. Cases where pirates maintain control of the ship for an extended period are rare and ransoms are only carried out by the most well developed groups (Raymond, 2009) . 8 The average duration from hijacking to ransom payment was 6 months in 2011 (Bellish, 2013) . 9 Somali pirates are estimated to earn $200 million each year in ransom payments (Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller, 2012) . In 2010 alone, 1181 people were taken hostage (International Maritime Bureau, 2011) with detention periods lasting up to 1,178 days (World Bank, 2013) .
For example, in 2009, it is estimated that only 0.2 percent of the ships passing through the Gulf of Aden were boarded by pirates (Gilpin, 2009) . Nonetheless, the substantially high costs of capture impose increased operating costs on all transiting ships. Ships transiting through pirate waters must pay higher risk premia on insurance, as well as on wages and benefits to crews as a result of the risk of being attacked, taken hostage, or even killed.
10 They must also engage in other defensive measures such as hiring security forces, increasing travel speed in pirate waters with consequent increases in fuel use, and modifying ships to make them less likely to be hijacked (de Groot, Rablen, and Shortland, 2012) . Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller (2012) estimate that shipping costs through the Gulf of Aden have increased by 8-13 percent following the increase of pirate activity.
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It is important to highlight that Somali pirates are responsible for the great majority of hijackings, because they have access to safe havens in Somalia where hostage ships and crew can be held for a prolonged period of time. In contrast, pirates elsewhere lack such safe havens and must generally limit their activities to theft (Raymond, 2009 (Frump, 2009) ; between 82 and 97 seafarers have died during pirate attacks, in Somali detention, or during rescue operations (World Bank, 2013) 11 For a discussion of how ships choose which, if any, defense measures to employ and the resulting changes in the probability of successful pirate attacks given these choices see McDermott, Horn, Siwal, and Bohara (2014).
trade, which helps us derive the econometric model and the identification strategy.
The Gravity Equation
Following the trade literature, we consider an N -country world with the representative consumer of each country deriving utility from all available products according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. For simplicity of exposition, we disregard the time dimension available in our panel dataset, and focus for now on characterizing trade at a given point in time. Standard utility maximization subject to the budget constraint leads to the following aggregate import demand function, d ij , in country i for a product traded by country j :
where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution across products, Y i is the aggregate expenditure in country i (i.e., GDP), P i is the CES price index and represents the aggregate price of the entire consumption bundle, and p ij is the import price paid in country i for a good produced in country j. The import price includes the factory gate price, p j , and the ad-valorem (iceberg) trade cost τ ij , such that:
Summing the expenditure per product in country i across all the n j symmetric products traded by the exporting country j results in the following equation for the volume of trade between countries i and j:
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , we can use the goods market clearing condition in the exporting country j (i.e.,
, to substitute for the endogenous factory price p j and for the number of products n j in equation (3), and get the familiar expression of the gravity equation:
where
Y i represents the world income. Π j is a function of all countries' CES price indexes that, under the assumption of symmetric bilateral trade costs, becomes equivalent to the own CES price index P j .
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The log of the gravity equation (4) defines the econometric model that is typically taken to the data in order to estimate the impact of the trade costs τ ij on the volume of bilateral trade:
As pointed out by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , one empirical challenge in correctly identifying a gravity equation of bilateral trade comes from the fact that the importer and exporter price indexes, known as"multilateral resistance" terms, are unobservable. And because they are a direct function of the bilateral trade costs and of countries' income levels, their omission from the regression model biases the main coefficients of interest. In our specific case, the effect of maritime piracy on bilateral trade is going to be biased if omitting from the estimation model the multilateral resistance terms. Our solution to this problem is to use importer and exporter specific fixed effects to account for the multilateral resistance terms.
Adding also the time subscripts specific to the panel dimension of our dataset, the preferred gravity equation specification can be written as:
where ijt represents an error term and accounts for measurement error in reported trade flows, as well as for any unobserved determinants of bilateral trade.
12 To be precise:
. When τ ij = τ ji , then Π j = P j .
Piracy and the Trade Cost Function
We model the bilateral trade costs τ ijt as a function of the transportation cost between countries i and j, as well as other implicit trade frictions known to affect their international trade. The bilateral transportation cost is assumed to be determined by the geographic distance between the two trading partners, Dist ij , and by the extent of maritime piracy on that trade route at a given point in time, i.e., P irateRisk ijt . 13 We denote the other trade frictions by a vector Z ij of bilateral variables, and consider factors such as common language and colonial linkage indicators, as well as participation in bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.
14 In summary,
we assume the following bilateral trade cost function:
We measure the risk of piracy in two ways. First, we follow the current literature in using the log of the number of reported pirate attacks in a given year carried out in the proximity of Somalia, Somali Attacks t . 15 Unfortunately, this measure is not without problems, as it could severely underestimate the impact of piracy on trade. One reason is reverse causality: the increase in attacks may be partially due to an increase in available targets, something that is quite possible given the significant increase in trade through the gulf of Aden (see figure 5 ).
Another reason is that shipper's unobserved investments in protection (which increase trade costs) could help reduce the number of recorded attacks.
For these reasons, we also use the variable Reach t , defined as the maximum extent of pirate reach into the sea up until time t. This alternative measure of piracy risk has the advantage of being largely free from these problems. We found no strong reason to suspect that pirates' geographic span of control has to increase at the same rate as the growth of regional trade. In the same way, there is no strong reason to believe that in the absence of changes in aggregate
trade -beyond what is predicted by countries' geography and rate of economic growth -the reach of maritime piracy cannot vary over time. Our view is that the geographic expansion of pirate activity is more likely an outcome of the safe haven provided by the position and lawless state of Somalia, the increased availability of technology to pirates, and a slow reaction and coordination of anti-pirate activities at international level. These conditions provided the suitable environment for the existence and growth of pirate organizations, whose accumulated capital and experience over time allowed them to expand.
In identifying the effect of piracy on transportation costs, we rely on two assumptions. First, we assume that piracy increases shipping costs only if the predicted trade route between i and j goes through pirate waters. Second, transport costs along pirate waters are monotonically related with the intensity of pirate activity. Given the geography of pirate attacks around Somalia, we assume that trade moves through pirate waters if the most likely trade route (measured by minimum maritime distance between a pair of countries) passes through the Gulf of Aden, or through the Indian Ocean. Letting Aden ij be the indicator variable for trade routes through the Gulf of Aden, and letting IO ij be the equivalent for trade routes through the Indian Ocean (see Appendix Table 8 for a tabulation of these two variables by country pair), the trade cost function τ ijt for a given time period t can be written in log form as:
where the time fixed effect α t captures changes in global trade costs that are common to all country pairs, including changes in the risk of piracy.
The ad-valorem tax imposed by piracy on trade moving through the Gulf of Aden is given by γ 2 , while the tax on trade passing through the Indian Ocean is given by γ 4 . Note that due to the Gulf of Aden being a narrow passage for ships, all trade transiting through it is subject to piracy. On the other hand, as piracy on the Indian Ocean is concentrated in the North West part of the ocean, not all the trade through the Indian Ocean is occurring in pirate waters.
Thus, the average tax on trade through this area, captured by γ 4 , should be smaller than γ 2 .
Substituting the trade cost function into the gravity equation given by equation (6), we get:
where the coefficients β κ ≡ (1 − σ)γ κ , with κ ∈ 0, 4, are reduced form coefficients. Thus, the estimated reduced form effect of piracy on the volume of bilateral trade, given by β 2 , combines the effect of piracy on the cost of transport (γ 2 ), as well as the price elasticity of demand (σ), which also represents the elasticity of substitution among the products in the consumption
basket. An implication of this underlying parameter structure is that for a given piracy shock to the cost of shipping goods between two countries, the responsiveness in the volume of imports is larger if the consumers in country i can easily find a substitute for goods produced by country j (i.e., σ is large).
The trade effect of Somali piracy formalized in equation (9) is identified from the differential changes in the volume of bilateral trade across affected versus unaffected trade routes (i.e., difference-in-differences). The regression estimates correctly identify the reduction in trade due to piracy provided that piracy does not affect country pairs trading outside of pirate waters.
A potential concern could arise if exporters increase trade with "safe" partners in response to diminishing trade with "risky" partners, in which case β 2 and γ 2 would capture an upper bound of the trade destruction effect of piracy. However, based on the theory framework, such substitution patterns across trade partners are entirely driven by variation in the multilateral resistance term (i.e., P i in equation (1)). More specifically, when the bilateral cost of trading with a particular country increases due to piracy, the importer price index increases as well, lowering the relative price of imports from other countries. As a result, a larger expenditure share gets allocated to products from lower trade cost, i.e., "safe" partners. Essential to our estimation, this reallocation of expenditures and increase in spending towards low trade cost partners is proportional to the change in the importer price index. So, by controlling for the multilateral resistance terms, we already account for substitution effects across trade partners. The potential for substitution effects makes it essential to control for importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects.
A second issue is that those costs associated with Somali piracy and affecting overall trade are not going to be captured by the coefficient of interest in the regression equation (9). For instance, some countries may reduce their expenditure share on all foreign goods because they allocate national resources towards fighting piracy. If the fall is proportional across all trading partners, this piracy-related trade cost is not captured in our regression estimate. Rather, the trade reduction is absorbed by the country-year fixed effects. In that sense, our estimates of the impact of Somali piracy on international trade capture a partial equilibrium effect.
In estimating equation (9), it is necessary to account for the fact that trade across different regions grows at different rates for other exogenous reasons, and these growth rates could be spuriously related to trade via the Gulf of Aden. We will address this omitted variable bias problem by showing that our estimate of β 2 is robust to the inclusion of a broad set of importer and exporter controls, including importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. Finally, we use the Cameron-Gelbach-Miller procedure to cluster standard errors by importer-year pairs to capture any consumer-specific cyclical component in the error term (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2011) . Alternative error structures do not change the significance of our results.
Tariff Equivalent of Maritime Piracy. If reliable data on bilateral trade costs τ ijt were available for a large set of countries, we would estimate an extended version of the equation (8) to directly find the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy, i.e.,γ 2 . Unfortunately, this approach is not feasible for us since the c.i.f./f.o.b. price ratios that could be calculated from the COMTRADE data and used as proxies for iceberg trade costs are notoriously noisy (Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2006) . Instead, we exploit the structure of the gravity model together with the estimated coefficients from equation (9) to make inferences about the magnitude of the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy. That is, we calculateγ 2 =β 2 /(1 −σ) by using estimates from the trade literature for the elasticity of substitution σ. 16 From these data we construct our two explanatory variables:
Somali Attacks and Reach.
The first measure of piracy, Somali Attacks, is calculated by summing up all the attacks initiated by suspected Somali pirates during each year of the sample, regardless of the assailants' nationality on record. Pirates' nationalities are recorded with significant error, with many attacks in the Gulf of Aden being attributed to a number of nationalities. In our main specifications, we considered as "Somali" all pirate activities that took place in the Gulf of Aden or in the North-Western part of the Indian Ocean (refer to the Appendix Table A1 for the detailed listing of pirate nationalities included in our definition of Somali piracy). However, in one of our robustness exercises we experiment with a more narrowly defined measures of Somali piracy, and show that it has no qualitatively different impact on our estimates.
17
To construct the second measure of piracy, Reach, we use a GIS program to calculate the geographic distance d it between the location of each attack i that took place at time t and the closest point along the Somali coast. We define the geographic reach of pirates as the distance of the furthest attack into the sea up to that time period, i.e., Reach t = max s≤t {d is }. Since this measure is sensitive to outliers (i.e., isolated events of local piracy across the East African or Arabian peninsula coast), we consider only those attacks attributed to Somalian, Yemeni, or Eritrean pirates. As the GPS coordinates of each attack were not reported by the IMB prior to year 2000, the measure Reach is available only from that year onwards. For consistency, we limit our main data analysis to the sample period 2000-2010 (although we exploit the information on piracy attacks prior to 2000 in one robustness exercise).
It is possible that our two measures of piracy risk suffer from nonclassical measurement error. For instance, it is possible that not all the incidents that actually happened over time were reported by the victimized ships to the IMB. It is also possible that the degree of underreporting may have changed with sailors' awareness of the Somali piracy problem. To the extent that under-reporting is more of an issue in the early years of the sample, we would overestimate the true increase in piracy over time. This will reduce both the magnitude and precision of the regression coefficients, making our estimates a lower bound. A second potential problem is that, lacking the GPS coordinates of pirate attacks prior to the year 2000, we could underestimate the true geographic reach of pirates in the early part of the sample (if, for example, pirate reach was extensive prior to 2000). However, we believe that this is unlikely to be the case, as anecdotal evidence suggests Somali piracy was limited to the coastal regions throughout the nineties and early 2000s (World Bank, 2013) .
Bilateral import volumes. Our bilateral trade data comes from the COMTRADE database provided by the United Nations. It specifies, for all 150 countries in the sample, the total value of imports by product category and source country in a given year. Starting from the HS 6-digit level of product differentiation, we construct two measures of bilateral trade: one that captures the total value of trade, aggregated across all traded goods, and one that measures only trade in "bulk" commodities -i.e., unprocessed and semi-processed agricultural and mineral goods.
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Appendix Table A2 lists the HS 2-digit sectors, and the number of HS 6-digit products within each sector that are considered bulk commodities and are included in our classification. Due to their low value to weight ratio, these goods are more likely to travel by ship rather than air; also, their vessels are easier for pirates to board and attack compared to containerized ships.
Trade routes and piracy exposure. We define trade between countries i and j to be exposed to Somali piracy if the trading route connecting the two locations passes through the Indian Ocean or the Gulf of Aden. Since the COMTRADE database does not include information on maritime routes, these routes were imputed by mapping the shortest sea path linking a trade country pair. We then determined whether the shortest path transits through the Indian Ocean or the Gulf of Aden. Appendix Figure A1 indicates how countries were assigned to regions while Appendix Table A3 indicates how region-pairs were assigned to trade routes with pirate risks.
Control variables. The trade regressions estimated in this paper follow the gravity model common in the trade literature and, as such, we rely on a standard set of regression control variables. The CEPII Gravity Dataset provides all gravity variables that are constant over time. Sample country coverage. We restricted the COMTRADE data in the following way.
While the data are available from 1991, we restrict attention to the period 2000-2010, which coincides with the beginning and expansion of piracy in the region. Due to ambiguity in determining some of the trade routes, we drop trade involving countries with multiple route profiles, 19 Details about the data construction can be found in (Head, Mayer, and Ries, 2010 which are the result of countries having ports on multiple seas (e.g., Russia, Saudi Arabia), or being landlocked and without a clear sea trade route (e.g., Kazakhstan). These countries are designated as "other" in Figure A1 . We further remove all trade between neighboring countries, as they mostly trade by land. Finally, we dropped Somalia from the sample as Somali trade is likely to be endogenous with Somali pirate activity.
Summary statistics. Panel A of Table 1 
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[ Table 1 Here] Panel B provides summary statistics for some explanatory variables, including the number of attacks and the furthest distance from the Somali coast to an attack. 31 percent of the country-pairs used in the analysis have an imputed trade linkage through the Gulf of Aden.
The Suez Canal provides passage to 17 percent of the total trade and 9.8 percent of bulk trade in our estimation sample. We use these values to calculate the total trade cost of piracy.
Estimation Results
Total imports. We begin with the analysis of the effects of piracy on the volume of total bilateral imports. We estimate equation (9) and report in Table 2 six different fixed effects specifications. Each specification gradually restricts the amount of data variation used for 22 http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=3 model identification in order to contain the sources of omitted variable bias. In column 1, we estimate a gravity model that includes only year fixed effects, which controls for cyclical and secular changes in global trade. In the second column we add importer, exporter, and year fixed effects. This specification controls for time-invariant country specific characteristics such as geography, industrial specialization, or the average openness to international trade. To better control for idiosyncratic shocks and differential growth rates across countries, column 3 includes importer-specific year dummies, while column 4 adds exporter-specific linear time trends. To account for the fact that the 2008 recession caused a large decline in global trade, with potentially differential consequences across countries, in column 5 we interact a "financial crisis" dummy (set equal to one starting with year 2008) with the exporter-specific linear trend.
This specification presumes that the crisis had a different impact across countries, affected not only their level of exports, but also their trend. The most demanding specification is presented in column 6, which incorporates both importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects. This specification accounts for year-by-year changes in import and export patterns that are specific to each trading country but common across their bilateral trade partners. While demanding in terms of data variation, this is our preferred specification as it accounts for the unobserved multilateral resistance terms defined in the theory section.
Across all specifications, we are interested in the interaction between the annual Somali pirate attacks and trade through the Gulf of Aden. We find a negative estimated coefficient on this interaction term: bilateral trade through the Gulf of Aden falls relative to trade through other routes in the years of high Somali pirate activity. The magnitude of the coefficient decreases as we implement a more exhaustive structure of fixed effects, going from -0.07 (in the estimation that only accounts for time-invariant country-specific characteristics) to -0.04 in the preferred specification reported in column 6. This coefficient change suggests that the importer and exporter-specific time effects are essential in accounting for unobservable trade determinants, whose omission would otherwise bias the piracy effect downward. The larger estimates in absolute value that we find when using less stringent fixed effect models, such as, for example, the Column 2 specification, are consistent with the results found in previous studies (e.g., World Bank, 2013; Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2012) .
To quantify the impact of maritime piracy, we use the fact that pirate attacks grew by an Table 2 also reports coefficients on the interaction between piracy and trade through the Indian Ocean. The estimated coefficients are negative, suggesting that piracy has a negative impact on trade between countries in the Indian Ocean. However, the results are not statistically significant in our most rigorous specifications.
24 Finally, the gravity control variables are generally significant and have the expected sign. This is true throughout our analysis and, as such, we report only the variables of interest in the remaining tables.
[ Table 2 Here] Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (9) using the alternative measure of piracy -i.e., pirate reach. Exploiting this alternative source of data variation in maritime 23 In this study, we define the piracy-induced "loss of trade" as the reduction in the volume of imports from a particular trade partner, which is caused by the increase in iceberg trade costs as a result of Somali pirate activity. To be specific, if X ij defines the volume of imports of country i from country j traveling through the Gulf of Aden, then an increase in PirateRisk between periods 0 and 1 cause a loss of trade given by:
whereβ 2 represents the estimated coefficient on the interaction term Aden ij × P irateRisk t in equation (9), and X 0 = X 1 /(1 +β 2 (%∆P iracy)). Our trade loss calculation is similar to Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2012) . It differs from the World Bank (2013) study as the latter calculates the trade-related cost of piracy by applying the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of piracy to the volume of trade passing through the Gulf of Aden. The strategy adopted by the World Bank thus does not take into account the demand response from an increase in import prices due to piracy, which explains why the study arrives at a smaller estimated cost of piracy. 24 We also ran each specification while including a dummy variable for trade traveling through the Strait of Malacca and an interaction term with the number of attacks there. Generally, the coefficients on these variables are not significant and their inclusion do not affect our other estimated coefficients.
piracy, we again find strong significance in our variable of interest. As before, the coefficient magnitude decreases as we include more stringent controls and fixed effects. These controls are therefore important in preventing one from overstating the impact of piracy. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between Indian Ocean trade and piracy remains negative, statistically insignificant, and consistently smaller than the interaction between the Gulf of Aden indicator and piracy. In terms of magnitude, the estimate in column 6 suggests that a 100 percent increase in pirate reach is associated with an 8.2 percent decrease in trade through the [ Table 3 Here] Imports of bulk goods. We next assess how piracy has affected trade in bulk goods, the category we expect to be most susceptible to piracy. We estimate Equation (9) and report the results in Table 4 . For conciseness, we only report the three more comprehensive fixed effects specifications corresponding to columns 4 -6 in Tables 2 and 3. In displaying the bulk trade results, the first three columns use the number of pirate attacks as the measure of pirate activity, while the last three columns use the pirate reach measure.
Focusing on the magnitude of the coefficients, we find larger estimated effects of piracy on bulk trade relative to overall trade. In part this is driven by the larger elasticity of import demand for homogenous goods, such as the bulk commodities. But this is also the result of a higher responsiveness of trade costs to piracy risks, justified by the fact that ships carrying bulk goods are more likely to be boarded and attacked. The estimate from the preferred specification in column 3 of Table 4 implies a 4.1 percent reduction in trade per year from 2005-2010 as a result of the 48.1 percent increase in pirate attacks annually in the Gulf of Aden, while column 6 suggests a 3.3 percent reduction due to the 21.3 percent annual increase in reach.
[ Table 4 Here] Trade Costs. As discussed in section 3.2, we can infer the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy from the gravity equation estimates. Focusing on the results for bulk trade reported in column 3 of Table 4 , and assuming an elasticity of substitution for bulk commodities of 10, we calculate an ad-valorem tariff equivalent of maritime piracy equal to 0.009 (which corresponds toγ 2 in equation (8)).
25 Given an average increase in piracy attacks by 48.1 percent per year, the implied increase in the iceberg trade cost is 0.45 percent on average.
Making the same comparison based on the piracy reach coefficients, the tariff equivalent of maritime piracy derived from the estimates in Table 4 column 6 is 0.017 percent. At an average annual increase in piracy reach by 21.3 percent, the estimate implies an increase in the ad-valorem trade cost of 0.36 percent due to Somali piracy.
The inferred ad-valorem tariff equivalent of piracy turns out to be much smaller in magnitude than the existing estimates in the literature, e.g., Besley, Fetzer, and Mueller (2012) . However, we think that the range of values that our calculated tariff equivalents fall into are more likely to be representative for a larger group of traded goods.
Robustness
We next explore the robustness of our coefficients of interest to a number of alternative specifications. The results are reported in Table 5 . Each reported specification follows the preferred structure of fixed effects as used in column 6 of Table 4 by 1 − σ = 1 − 10 = −9. Note that the values for the elasticity of substitution σ typically assumed in the trade literature range between 5 and 10 for all goods trade (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) among others). Given our focus on more homogenous product categories such as bulk commodities, we have decided to experiment with the upper bound value of σ.
would enter Equation (9) with a one year lag.
Panel A displays the results for our key variables of interest when we lag the piracy measure by one year. The results are similar to our estimates using a contemporaneous measure of attacks (reach), but they are smaller in magnitude and less significant. Further lags (2 years, etc.) as were used in Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzoso (2012) yielded insignificant results. The significance of both contemporaneous and one year lagged attacks indicates that there is some delay in trade responsiveness but the delay is much less than a full year.
In panel B we account for pirate activity in the Strait of Malacca in order to ensure that our estimates for Somali piracy are not spuriously capturing other effects. Thus, we include a dummy for trade passing through the Strait of Malacca, as well as an interaction term between the Malacca dummy and the number of recorded attacks in Malacca. We take this exercise a step further in panel C and include all piracy regions around the world and the associated attack measures. Comparing these panels to the results in Table 2 indicates that our estimates are robust to conditioning on piracy activity in other regions.
[ Table 5 Here]
In panel D, we report estimates based on a more narrow definition of Somali attacks, which includes only those countries used to create our reach variable. While this measure is in some sense more precise, it may be inaccurate when measuring attacks because pirates' country of origin is based on the judgement of the attacked ship. In the early years of Somali piracy, captains almost always simply chose the closest country as the likely initiator of the attack.
As Somali piracy became more well known, captains began to assume that attacks came from Somali bases regardless of what country shores the ship was closest to when the attack occurred.
In panel E, we return to our baseline specification and definition of attacks, but limit our sample to the period 2005-2010, years in which Somali pirates were the most active. With the sample size reduction, we lose some precision; however, the results are broadly consistent with the findings from the baseline sample. Finally, in our last robustness exercise reported in panel F we expand our sample to include all available observations going back to 1991. Our piracy attacks measure becomes larger and more significant when early years are included.
In the online appendix accompanying this paper, we show a number of additional results. We re-estimate the main specifications instrumenting one piracy measure with the other measure, and using a poisson estimation strategy. We also report estimates based on a sample that excludes the post-crisis period. These estimates broadly confirm the results of the paper.
Finally, we show that the trade-reducing effects of Somali piracy come from the intensive margin of trade (i.e., adjustments in the volume of trade within a country pair), and not the extensive margin (i.e., the probability of ceasing trade with certain trade partners).
Heterogeneity Analysis
We now explore the underlying heterogeneity of the estimated trade cost of piracy, starting with differences in country-pair distance. There are a number of reasons to think that partners trading through the Gulf of Aden and located in close proximity to one another should suffer larger trade losses compared to more distant country pairs. This is because the distance travelled through pirate waters represents a larger fraction of the total route distance. Furthermore, there may be fewer or less cost-effective ocean routes that could be taken as feasible substitutes to transiting via the Gulf of Aden. To study this issue, we estimate equation (9) on the subsample of country pairs whose bilateral distance is below (above) the median distance. Panels A and B of table 6 report the results. It is immediately clear that the estimated trade costs are associated with short routes rather than long routes. The coefficient estimate on Aden × P irateRisk is twice as large on short routes relative to the baseline specification from tables 2 and 3, respectively, and they are strongly significant. Looking at bulk trade, the coefficient of interest goes from -0.085 (using the number of attacks) in the full sample, to -0.300, and from -0.154 (using pirate reach) to -0.436. On the other hand, the coefficients estimated on the subsample of long routes are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Clearly, proximity to pirate waters matters.
We next consider the possibility that the "piracy tax" is unevenly distributed across poorer and richer countries. This could occur if, for instance, pirates target cargo ships transporting goods originating from or destined to developing countries, perhaps because these ships employ fewer defensive measures. An alternative, maybe more realistic scenario, is that pirates do not target, and shipping companies commingle cargo from different countries. In this case, we should not observe heterogeneity in our estimates based on income. In panel C and D, we run regressions on country pairs where at least one partner is below (panel C) or above (panel D) the median level of income observed in our data sample. Our estimates of the effect of piracy on total trade remain negative but lose precision, while the estimates for bulk trade remain consistently negative and significant. More importantly, the estimated coefficients remain very similar across the two panels, suggesting a lack of an income gradient. 
Distribution of the Burden of Piracy
A final consideration must be made about the distribution of the trade-related cost burden associated with Somali piracy across countries. Using annual data averaged over the sample period 2000-2010, we have constructed estimates of the annual value of lost trade for all the countries in our database. Table 7 reports the estimates for the most affected countries. Columns 1 and 2 provide country level statistics on the average income and value of trade traveling through the Gulf of Aden, while column 3 shows the share of total trade going through the Gulf of Aden.
Column 4 reports the monetary value of the annual loss of trade due to piracy, where we use the estimates from Table 2 in this way, it is clear that the burden of piracy falls very heavily on one trading block, i.e., the European Union. We estimate annual losses approximating $11 billion dollars, which represents a fully 44 percent of the global burden of piracy. 28 China, Japan, the UAE, and India make up the remaining countries with costs over $1 billion. Overall, 70 percent of the global cost of piracy accrue to only five countries and the EU. Table 7 highlights an important fact about piracy: while the estimated costs are not particularly large on a global scale and represent a very small share of trade for any country in the world, the monetary value of the losses are large and concentrated on few countries-most prominently, the European Union. It is thus unsurprising that the anti-piracy response has been led by countries on this list-the EU and US (through NATO), India, and China.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the extent to which maritime insecurity affects international This is a large number in relation to the benefits gained by pirates (estimated by the World Bank (2013) to be about $50 million per year), and it is somewhat larger than the existing $18 billion estimate from the World Bank of the trade effects of piracy. Our larger estimates are the result of addressing an important limitation in the existing literature, namely the presence of omitted variable biases, the endogeneity of pirate attack incidents, the use of more precise measurement of piracy risk, and a slightly different way of measuring costs that take into full account demand responses to the piracy threat. While these trade costs remain small relative to the total flow of trade, we find that these costs are not evenly distributed, with a handful of countries shouldering a great majority of the costs. Note: The data display documents the construction and the variation in piracy reach over time. The dashed line corresponds to the monthly number of attacks attributed to Somali pirates (following the assignment described in the Appendix table A1). The continuous line traces the distance (in kilometers) to the furthest offshore point where a pirate attack was reported in a given month. Piracy reach is defined as the largest distance that was ever traveled by pirates to date, and is represented in the graph by the long dashed line. Note: The figure illustrates the fraction of global trade (by value) that is potentially exposed to the risk of maritime piracy over time. This fraction is calculated based on the set of country pairs for which the shortest maritime route goes through the Gulf of Aden and/or the Suez Canal. For comparison, we also plot the number of pirate attacks in that region over time. Note: The reported results correspond to a gravity model of trade specified by equation (9). The estimation sample covers worldwide bilateral trade over the period 2000-2010. The dependent variable represents the total bilateral volume of imports (in logs). The Aden and Indian Ocean dummy variables are equal to 1 whenever the shortest maritime route connecting two trading partners goes through the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean, respectively. Somali Attacks are the total number of Somali pirate attacks occurring within the calendar year; for specifics on assignment of attacks to Somali pirates see Appendix 1. All other regression variables are standard gravity variables, whose description is provided in the paper. Note: The reported results correspond to a gravity model of trade specified by equation (9). The estimation sample covers worldwide bilateral trade over the period 2000-2010. The dependent variable represents the total bilateral volume of imports (in logs). The Aden and Indian Ocean dummy variables are equal to 1 whenever the shortest maritime route connecting two trading partners goes through the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean, respectively. The Somali pirate reach is calculated as the furthest distance from the location of a Somali pirate attack to the closest port on the Somali coast. Standard gravity equation variables -i.e., population and per-capita GDP for both trade partners, distance, common language, colonial ties, common colonizer, RTA, both WTO, ACP-EU -are included in all specifications but omitted from the table. Note: The reported results correspond to a gravity model of trade specified by equation (9). The estimation sample covers worldwide bilateral trade over the period 2000-2010. The dependent variable represents the bilateral volume of imports of bulk commodities (in logs). Details on the classification of traded goods are provided in the Appendix table A3. The Aden and Indian Ocean dummy variables are equal to 1 whenever the shortest maritime route connecting two trading partners goes through the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean, respectively. Somali piracy is measured either by the number of attacks in a year, or by pirates' reach (as in Table 3 ). Standard gravity equation variables -i.e., population and per-capita GDP for both trade partners, distance, common language, colonial ties, common colonizer, RTA, both WTO, ACP-EU -are included in all specifications but omitted from the table. Note: The table reports which HS 2-digit categories includes products that are traded as bulk commodities. The classification of products into bulk is available from (Cristea, Hummels, Puzzello, and Avetisyan, 2013) , and it is constructed at the HS 6-digit level of disaggregation using information from the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) database. The numbers reported in the third column indicate the number of HS 6-digit products considered to be traded in bulk within each HS 2-digit category. Note: The table reports all the worldwide bilateral trade flows included in our estimation sample that are subject to piracy threats in any part of the world. The indicator 1 identifies the routes along which ships are at risk of maritime piracy occurring in the region described by the appropriate column. Many region-pairs, including North America to Europe, are not included in this table. Region pairs that are not explicitly listed face no pirate threat along their imputed route. Note: The shaded trade regions were designed to encompass all countries that would use similar sea routes to trade with countries in another trade region. The countries labeled as Other have been dropped from the sample, mainly due to conflicts in assigning a unique trading route.
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